By 2020, tens of billions of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices with wireless interfaces will be in the marketplace and connect the modern world. Almost half of those IoT devices will have cellular radios. As a result, the likelihood of experiencing a cyber-attack by an RBSR continues to increase. Generally, RBSRs are classified as cellular routers that transmit outside the authority of the governing regulatory agency.
At a rudimentary level, low-cost commercial hardware and open source software can be employed by third parties to inflict significant attacks on enterprise Wi-Fi and cellular networks. Indeed, with a low-cost commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software-defined radio (SDR) kit and open source cellular base station software, a malicious actor can deny cellular service to smart devices and machine-to-machine (M2M) networks. Further, a malicious actor can remotely track persons via their phones, snoop on communications, and inject malicious software into devices. The consequences can range from unfavorable user experiences and social disturbances to more significant concerns including financial loss and negative media exposure.
There is a need in the art for techniques and architectures for detecting an RBSR, such as an illegal/rogue commercial cellular tower in a network, over multiple cellular protocols.
There is also a need in the art for techniques and architectures for identifying the technologies in use (e.g., Open BTS, OpenAirInterfaceLTE, etc.) by a detected RBSR.
There is also a need in the art for techniques and architectures for detecting a precursor event to cellular attacks over multiple cellular protocols.
There is yet a further need in the art for techniques and architectures for testing a base station router (BSR) in a cellular network.